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Article text: 
 
While the EU is often perceived as an organisation which functions on the consensus 
of its Member States, the Greek situation has shown that it can also instruct a 
Member State more directly, writes Jeremy Richardson. He argues that this trend 
towards greater policy imposition by the EU will only increase going forward, with 
implications both for the EU countries in the Eurozone and those outside it. 
 
The recent violent clashes we have seen in Greece, in protest against the bailout 
terms drafted at the Euro Summit on 12 July, are an inevitable reaction to what can 
only be described as an impositional and dirigiste style of EU government (the 
fashionable term governance seems quite inappropriate in this case). 
 
Some key aspects of the bailout conditions are pension reform; market reforms, 
including Sunday trading, sales periods and pharmacy ownership; privatisation of 
electricity transmission; reform of collective bargaining; broadening the tax base; 
overhaul of the civil justice system; and introduction of semi-autonomous spending 
cuts in case of deviations from primary budget surplus targets. 
 
Moreover, the agreement states that ‘the [Greek] government needs to consult and 
agree with the [EU] Institutions on all draft legislation in relevant areas with 
adequate time before submitting it for public consultation’ (emphasis added). This 
dirigiste approach does not end there, however. The oft-noted weakness of the EU 
in the crucial area of policy implementation seems not to extend to the Greek 
bailout. The independent fund which will be set up to receive the proceeds from 
asset sales, although managed by the Greek authorities, will be run ‘under the 
supervision of the relevant European Institutions’. 
 
Even the programme to modernise and strengthen the Greek administration will be 
put in place ‘under the auspices of the European Commission’. To be sure, it might 
be argued that such dirigisme has been seen before in pre-accession terms laid 
down for candidate countries, but it is probably unique in its scope and tone for 
existing Member States. 
 
I dwell on the Greek case because it seems to me a perfect illustration of just how 
far the transfer of power from Member States to the EU has gone. I have long 
argued that the EU has over time acquired for itself most of the features of Western 
democratic states, apart from (what I regard as a somewhat outdated feature of 
modern states) the monopoly of the legitimate use of violence. 
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Above all, it has acquired for itself, in very many policy areas, the central function 
of a modern state – the power to decide a vast range public policies that were 
hitherto the province of Member States. In that sense, the EU has acquired quite a 
high degree of sovereignty (and, as we see in the Greek case, extreme coercive 
power, if not the right to use physical force). By so doing, the EU has begun to look 
very state-like or, as I argue, has emerged as a policy-making state. 
 
Few policy areas seem to escape at least some form of ‘Europeanisation’ – not in 
the commonly accepted sense of ‘Europeanisation’, namely adaptation to EU ‘laws’ 
at Member State level (what I term ‘Euro-adaption’) – but the shift in the locus of 
public policy-making power to the EU level. Thus, by Europeanisation I mean ‘the 
processes by which the key decisions about public policies are gradually transferred 
to the European level (or for new policy areas, emerge at the European level)’. 
 
One of the most interesting aspects of the Greek bailout case, however, is that the 
policy style adopted by the EU was unusual. Governments can and do effect shifts 
in policy style, the Thatcher Governments being a notable example. However, most 
of us have up to now seen the EU as an almost classic example of a bargaining 
policy style, emphasising the incorporation of interests in a process of promiscuous 
consensus building, often concerned with incremental, rather than radical, policy 
change. 
 
To be sure, the Greek bailout case does not need to cause us to abandon that 
characterisation of the EU policy process. The style has seemed to be embedded, 
although it might have been more correct to talk of multiple policy styles in the EU. 
Whilst policy formulation has generally been consensual and participatory, the 
outcome has often been the growth of EU regulation. Thus, even within the velvet 
glove of ‘new governance’ in the EU one can detect a mailed fist! 
 
The Greek case might be quite worrying as a portent of just how far the EU could 
develop as a policy-making state. Membership of the Monetary Union means that 
those Member States which have joined face some special decision rules that do 
not apply to those which have not. Monetary Union can be argued to be the most 
advanced case of ‘Europeanisation’ so far (in the sense I define it). 
 
However, whilst the Greek case might be unusual, we might well see more cases of 
EU dirigisme, at least in the future management of the Eurozone. In a forthcoming 
article in the Journal of European Public Policy, ‘Monetary Disunion: The Domestic 
Politics of Euroland’, Wolfgang Streeck and Lea Elsässer argue that the imbalances 
between the rich and poor countries in ‘Euroland’ will mean that ‘...two goods will 
be traded between the centre and the periphery of the Union: financial support 
given by the former to the latter, and political control conceded in return by the 
latter to the former’. 
 
It would be wrong, however, to see the dangers of a more dirigiste EU as of concern 
to only Eurozone members (particularly those whose economies have structural 
weaknesses). Elsewhere, I have argued that we have seen an onward march of 
Europeanisation which is not destined to be halted any day soon. There are tectonic 
forces within the EU that drive the Europeanisation process onwards. 
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The Greek case shows that, under certain circumstances, the EU can shift its 
policy-making style from consensual bargaining to dirigiste imposition. In short, 
the EU can bite! 
 
For further information, see the author’s edited volume: Constructing a Policy-
Making State?: Policy Dynamics in the EU (Oxford University Press, 2012). 
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